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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I. INTRODUCTION

This Survey covers the period from June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016.1 The
Article discusses attorney discipline, ineffective assistance of counsel,
legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, judicial ethics, several
miscellaneous cases involving legal ethics, opinions of the Formal
Advisory Opinion Board, and amendments to the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct.
II. LAWYER DISCIPLINE 2

A.

Disbarments3

1. Trust Account Abuse or Other Financial Transgressions
The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred seven lawyers for violations of
their duties with respect to financial matters. Michael L. Terrell
voluntarily surrendered his license after he failed to account to his client
* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (B.A., 1979);
University of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bars
of Georgia and Texas.
1. For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics during the June 1, 2013 to May 31, 2015
survey period, see Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 67
MERCER L. REV. 107 (2015).
2. In addition to the matters recited in the text, the Investigative Panel of the State
Disciplinary Board imposed confidential discipline in the form of Formal Letters of
Admonition in twenty-one cases and Investigative Panel Reprimands in thirteen cases. See
2016 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF GEORGIA at 2,
available at https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/16_
OGC_
Report.pdf.
3. Lawyers in Georgia can voluntarily surrender their licenses or submit a petition
for voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 4-110(f) (2016). The acceptance
of a voluntary surrender of a license or the granting of a petition for voluntary discipline of
disbarment are tantamount to disbarment by the court and are treated as such in this
Article. Id.
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for a $100,000 check he received in settlement of the client's personal
injury case.4 David P. Hartin also voluntarily surrendered his license,
after he failed to account to his divorce client for the proceeds of the sale
of the marital home, which were to be distributed equally to the divorcing
parties.5 Jin Choi gave up his license after he failed to take proper care
of funds entrusted to him in his fiduciary capacities, including funds for
business ventures and funds involving his law practice.6
Douglas J. Mathis lost his license because he abandoned his law office
and converted client funds in connection with a real estate closing and
an irrevocable trust.7 Russ Floyd Barnes voluntarily surrendered his
license after he admitted that he took $275,000 of funds held in a
fiduciary capacity from his firm's trust account.8 The special master
found (and the court agreed) that he should lose his license even though
he claimed (albeit without documentation) he replaced the funds and no
client was harmed. 9 The court disbarred Tesha Nicole Clemmons because
she did not maintain communication with her personal injury client,
settled the case without the client's authority, failed to disburse any of
the funds to the client or keep them in her trust account, and made false
statements to the Investigative Panel.10
In one of the more bizarre cases, the court accepted the petition of Tony
L. Axam to voluntarily surrender his license, after Axam acted as
"paymaster" for a client.11 At the direction of a client, an individual wired
$100,000 to Axam's operating account (he did not have a trust account),
and Axam then disbursed the money (minus a fee of $5000 for his trouble)
as directed by his client. 12 Axam did not know the nature of the
underlying business and asked no questions, but when he failed to
provide an accounting of the funds, the person who sent the money to him
filed the grievance that led to Axam surrendering his license. 13

2.

Client Abandonment, Lack of Communication, or Both

The supreme court disbarred ten lawyers primarily for either client
abandonment or lack of communication, or both. Stephen Bailey Wallace,

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

In re Terrell, 298 Ga. 86, 86, 779 S.E.2d 373, 373 (2015).
In re Hartin, 299 Ga. 10, 10, 785 S.E.2d 541, 541 (2016).
In re Choi, 297 Ga. 793, 793, 778 S.E.2d 228, 228 (2015).
In re Mathis, 297 Ga. 867, 868, 778 S.E.2d 793, 793 (2015).
In re Barnes, 297 Ga. 498, 498-99, 775 S.E.2d 129, 129 (2015).
Id. at 499, 775 S.E.2d at 129.
In re Clemmons, 297 Ga. 732, 732-33, 777 S.E.2d 479, 479 (2015).
In re Axam, 297 Ga. 786, 787, 778 S.E.2d 222, 222-23 (2015).
Id. at 787, 778 S.E.2d at 222.
Id. at 787, 778 S.E.2d at 222-23.
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II defaulted and was disbarred because he filed suit on behalf of a
severely injured client in 2004 but filed nothing in the case after 2006,
resulting in the case's dismissal in 2013.14 Perrin Bowie Lovett lost his
license because he accepted payment of $1,000 to help a client in
connection with an estate and subsequently closed his practice, kept the
money, falsely told the client another lawyer would handle the matter for
no additional fee, and refused to return the money or the file. 15 Tanya
Yvette Brockington lost her license because she abandoned three clients
who paid her to help with immigration matters and never refunded their
money.16 Steven Salcedo was disbarred because he agreed to represent a
client in two medical malpractice claims but failed to file one at all,
caused the other to be dismissed by not appearing at a status conference,
did not inform the client of the status of her matters, was
uncommunicative with the client, and did not return her files. 17The court
disbarred William Charles Lea after he abandoned three clients and
refused to return any of the fees they had paid him.'8 Stephen B. Taylor
was disbarred when he took money to represent two clients in criminal
matters but did no work, abandoned the clients, did not communicate
with the clients or the client's family, and failed to return the fees.' 9
The court seemed somewhat reluctant when it accepted the petition of
Dianne Cook to surrender her license. 20 Cook, who had no prior
discipline, was cooperative with the investigation, and told the court she
no longer intended to practice, but she had neglected one matter for a
client at a time when she and her husband were in declining health. 21
Melissa Jill Starling lost her license after she defaulted in two
disciplinary matters related to her abandonment of clients. 22 In one,
Starling undertook to represent a client in a personal injury case but did
not consult the client about settlement, did not communicate with the
client, allowed the statute of limitations to expire, and then withdrew
without explanation. 23 In the other matter, Starling accepted $750 to
represent a client on an aggravated stalking charge but never
communicated with the client or took any steps to obtain bond for the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

In re Wallace, 299 Ga. 3, 4, 785 S.E.2d 534, 534-35 (2016).
In re Lovett, 297 Ga. 358, 358, 773 S.E.2d 771, 771 (2015).
In re Brockington, 297 Ga. 649, 649, 776 S.E.2d 185, 186 (2015).
In re Salcedo, 297 Ga. 725, 725-26, 777 S.E.2d 478, 478 (2015).
In re Lea, 297 Ga. 797, 797, 778 S.E.2d 228, 229 (2015).
In re Taylor, 298 Ga. 468, 468, 782 S.E.2d 670, 670 (2016).
In re Cook, 298 Ga. 382, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).
Id.
In re Starling, 297 Ga. 359, 773 S.E.2d 768 (2015).
Id. at 359-61, 773 S.E.2d at 768-69.
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client. 24 When the client replaced her, Starling did not refund the fee. 25

In both disciplinary matters, Starling attempted to open the default
judgments, but the special master found that she had met none of the
criteria for opening a default. 26
The court disbarred Joel David Myers as a result of his abandonment
of two clients. 27 In one case, Myers did not file pleadings, respond to
discovery, or respond to the client's requests for information. Myers also
misrepresented the work he had done and the justifications for his
substantial fees but refused to return unearned fees.28 In the other case,
Myers billed the client twice for the same work, borrowed $600 from the
client without satisfying Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8,29 did
not file the papers and fees necessary to achieve the client's objectives,
and lied to the client about whether he had done so.30
Wayne Peter Merisotis was disbarred after he undertook the
representation of two clients in criminal cases but gave them false
information about what he would do, failed to act with diligence, to
consult with the clients, to inform them of the status of their cases, to
comply with their reasonable requests for information, or to withdraw
from the cases. 3' In one of the cases, Merisotis failed to appear at
hearings and gave false information to the bar during its informal
investigation. 32

3.
Criminal Activity
The supreme court disbarred eight lawyers as a result of their criminal
activity. Charles B. Merrill, Jr. voluntarily surrendered his license after
being convicted of federal conspiracy to make false statements and
reports in connection with a loan from the Rural Development
Administration. 3 3 John R. Thompson was disbarred after he exhausted
his appeals from convictions on felony counts of conspiracy, bank fraud,
wire fraud, and mail fraud. 34 James Alan Langlais voluntarily
surrendered his license after he pled guilty, as a first offender, to felony

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 362, 773 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 359-60, 773 S.E.2d at 768-69.
Id. at 361, 773 S.E.2d at 769.
In re Myers, 297 Ga. 783, 778 S.E.2d 223 (2015).
Id. at 783-84, 778 S.E.2d at 224.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2016).
Myers, 297 Ga. at 784, 778 S.E.2d at 224.
In re Merisotis, 297 Ga. 471, 471, 775 S.E.2d 150, 151 (2015).
Id. at 471, 775 S.E.2d at 151.
In re Merrill, 297 Ga. 281, 281-82, 773 S.E.2d 280, 280 (2015).
In re Thompson, 297 Ga. 790, 790, 778 S.E.2d 226, 226 (2015).
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charges of false statements, false writings, and forgery. 35 Wilson R.
Smith gave up his license after he pled guilty in federal court to mail
fraud and aggravated identity theft.36 The court accepted Donald Carlton
Gibson's petition to relinquish his license after he pled guilty to bank
fraud, a felony.3 7 Tashawna Lacher Griffieth voluntarily surrendered her
license after pleading guilty in state court to a felony charge of firstdegree forgery. 38
Jennifer L. Wright pled guilty to felony possession of Alprazolam
(which is sold under the trade name Xanax) and was disbarred after the
evidence at her hearing showed that she had not been compliant with the
terms of her probation (including participation in drug treatment and
cessation of marijuana use), and had a history of arrests for driving under
the influence. She also had a history of failing to take responsibility,
blaming others, and lack of candor with a drug counselor. 3
In a more unusual case, because it involved a misdemeanor rather
than a felony, Dennis S. Childers lost his license after he pled guilty as a
first offender for having received a vehicle tag he knew was stolen and
doing so without the intention of restoring it to the owner. 40 The special
master found that this was a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
because it involved an act of dishonesty. 41 In light of Childers' prior
disciplinary history and the lack of significant mitigation, the court
approved the special master's recommendation of disbarment. 42
4.
Miscellaneous Disbarments
The supreme court disbarred three lawyers for other reasons. Jarlath
Robert MacKenna was disbarred because he undertook to represent two
clients (one of whom he abandoned) while his license to practice law had
been suspended. 43 The court disbarred Paul R. Koehler because he would
not stop litigating a matter that he had definitively lost.44 After the
supreme court had disposed of the matter, Koehler continued filing
frivolous motions in the superior court (some even after the client had

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

In re Langlais, 297 Ga. 363, 363, 773 S.E.2d 772, 772 (2015).
In re Smith, 298 Ga. 137, 137, 779 S.E.2d 663, 663 (2015).
In re Gibson, 298 Ga. 437, 437, 782 S.E.2d 442, 443 (2016).
In re Griffieth, 298 Ga. 436, 436, 782 S.E.2d 443, 443 (2016).
In re Wright, 299 Ga. 139, 139, 786 S.E.2d 686, 686 (2016).
in re Childers, 297 Ga. 788, 788, 778 S.E.2d 216, 217 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 789, 778 S.E.2d at 217.
In re MacKenna, 298 Ga. 826, 826, 784 S.E.2d 798, 798 (2016).
In re Koehler, 297 Ga. 794, 778 S.E.2d 218 (2015).
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fired him) and frivolous appeals in the court of appeals.45 Koehler also
filed a related federal civil action without his client's authority and made
deceitful and misleading statements in the complaint. 46
Jay Harvey Morrey undertook to represent clients on contingency
bases but did not prepare retainer agreements or any writing to describe
his fees and expenses, and he also failed to maintain adequate records of
his fee agreements.47 Morrey also represented a party in numerous
garnishment actions but never investigated his suspicion, which
apparently turned out to be correct, that his client was not actually the
party to the case.48 Morrey informed the court that his actions resulted
from depression and other emotional issues and conceded that he was
unable to practice law, and the court accepted his petition to voluntarily
surrender his license. 49
B.

Suspensions5 o

1.
Less Than Six Months
The supreme court suspended four lawyers for less than six months.
The court suspended Hugh 0. Nowell for two months and ordered a
public reprimand because Nowell falsely testified in two depositions in a
civil case. 51 The court gave Nowell lenient treatment because he took the
initiative to alert the court and the bar to what he had done and corrected
his false testimony. 52 The court accepted the petition for voluntary
discipline of Clifford E. Hardwick, IV and suspended him for ninety days
because he negligently misrepresented to a client that he had filed a
motion. 53 James A. Meaney, III was suspended in Tennessee for three
months (with an additional nine months of probation) for having
practiced law there while his Tennessee license was suspended, and the
Georgia Supreme Court imposed a ninety-day suspension of Meaney's
Georgia license as reciprocal discipline.54
45. Id. at 794-95, 778 S.E.2d at 218.
46. Id. at 795-96, 778 S.E.2d at 219.
47. In re Morrey, 298 Ga. 435, 435, 782 S.E.2d 444, 444 (2016).
48. Id. at 435, 782 S.E.2d at 444.
49. Id. at 436, 782 S.E.2d at 444.
50. This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and
does not discuss interim suspensions.
51. In re Nowell, 297 Ga. 785, 785, 778 S.E.2d 225, 225 (2015).
52. Id.
53. In re Hardwick, 297 Ga. 808, 808-09, 777 S.E.2d 442, 442-43 (2015).
54. In re Meaney, 298 Ga. 136, 136-37, 779 S.E.2d 662, 662-63 (2015). Because Georgia
does not allow for probation in its disciplinary system, the court could not impose discipline
that would have been identical to Tennessee's. Id. at 137, 779 S.E.2d at 663.
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The fourth case involved Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(d),55
which provides:
a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or
disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the
practice of law is conducted by the lawyer, to:
(1) represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar
status;
(2) have any contact with the clients of the lawyer either in person, by
telephone or in writing; or
(3) have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the
office either in person, by telephone or in writing.56
Mary Ellen Franklin shared office space with her husband who,
unbeknownst to Franklin, was practicing law while his license was
suspended.5 7 He told her falsely that his license had been reinstated, but
she never checked it herself.5 Her husband settled a case for a client but
misappropriated the funds. The court suspended Ms. Franklin for three
months, acknowledging that her violation of Rule 5.459 gave her husband
the chance to harm the client but also noting that she had no prior
disciplinary history, was suffering from depression, and was
remorseful.6 0
2.
Six Months to One Year
The supreme court imposed suspensions of six months to one year in
three cases. Gayle S. Graziano received a six-month suspension because
she neglected a client matter at a time when she was dealing with
personal health issues and the terminal illness of a close family
member. 61 Graziano was unable to attend a pre-trial conference and
instructed her client (with notice to opposing counsel) to appear without
her and ask for a continuance to obtain other counsel (Graziano had not
requested a leave of absence). 62 The client did not appear, and at the pretrial conference the trial court dismissed the client's case and set a
hearing on the opposing party's counterclaim. 63 Opposing counsel sent an
email notice to Graziano about that next hearing, but, because she did
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(d) (2016).
Id.
In re Franklin, 299 Ga. 4, 5, 785 S.E.2d 535, 536 (2016).
Id.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2016).
Franklin, 299 Ga. at 6, 785 S.E.2d at 536.
In re Graziano, 299 Ga. 7, 8-9, 785 S.E.2d 537, 538 (2016).
Id at 8, 785 S.E.2d at 538.
Id.
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not see the email, she neither attended the hearing nor notified her
client, and the court rendered judgment against her client. 64 The court
noted the personal circumstances with which Graziano was dealing and
her lack of disciplinary history and accepted her petition for voluntary
discipline of a six-month suspension.65
Tony C. Jones received a suspension of one year (to be served
consecutively with two other suspensions that had already been ordered)
as a result of three grievances.66 In one, Jones could not initially refund
a client's fee when Jones had to withdraw because of one of the other
suspensions.6 7 Although the matter was eventually resolved, Jones failed
to respond to the grievance.68 In the second matter, Jones violated his
duty of communication by not responding to three letters from a client
(Jones maintained that he never received the letters) about the client's
appeal, although Jones claimed he had told the client that his
representation ended with the client's guilty plea.6 9 In the third matter,

a client's family wrote to him about trying to correct the sentence the
client received as a result of a guilty plea, but Jones did not respond for
many months, until long after the time to withdraw the plea had
expired. 70
Nakata S. Smith Fitch's petition for a six-month suspension was
accepted, as discipline for having charged excessive fees and expenses for
a conservatorship and for not having paid a judgment of the probate court
to reimburse that money.71 The court noted in mitigation that the failure
to pay was the result of financial difficulties, made worse by the illness
and death of Fitch's husband. 72
3.
Indefinite
The supreme court imposed two indefinite suspensions (other than
interim suspensions). Peggy Ruth Goodnight was suspended indefinitely
until she received a previously-ordered Review Panel reprimand after
she failed three times to appear to receive the reprimand. 73 The court
accepted Ricky W. Morris, Jr.'s voluntary petition for an indefinite

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id at 9, 785 S.E.2d at 538-39.
In re Jones, 298 Ga. 185, 780 S.E.2d 672 (2015).
Id. at 185-86, 780 S.E.2d at 672-73.
Id. at 186, 780 S.E.2d at 673.
Id.
Id. at 186-87, 780 S.E.2d at 673.
In re Fitch, 298 Ga. 379, 379-380, 782 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2016).
Id. at 380, 782 S.E.2d at 41.
In re Goodnight, 297 Ga. 651, 777 S.E.2d 250 (2015).
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emergency suspension while various disciplinary and criminal matters,
which may have arisen from his addiction and mental health issues, were
resolved. 74
C.

Public Reprimands

The supreme court imposed public reprimands in five cases. William
F. Heitmann, III successfully petitioned for a public reprimand as
discipline for his failure to take appropriate measures to see that an
independent contractor he employed conformed his conduct to
Heitmann's professional obligations. 75 Without Heitmann's knowledge,
the contractor solicited three potential clients who had been in
automobile accidents to allow Heitmann to represent them.76 Michael
Anthony Eddings received a public reprimand because he violated Rule
4.2 (the "no-contact rule") by communicating on the eve of a criminal trial
with people whom he knew to be represented by counsel. 7 Tiffini Colette
Bell's petition for a public reprimand was accepted as discipline for her
failures in a child custody case to truthfully communicate with her client
about the appointment of a guardian ad litem and about discovery, to
respond in a timely manner to discovery, to seek the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, and to prepare for hearings.78 Just over one week
later-just outside the survey period for this Article-Bell's discipline was
changed to a Review Panel reprimand. 7
Susan Michele Brown represented a wife in a divorce action and was
supposed to hold funds from the sale of marital property in trust and
disburse them at the close of the proceedings, but Brown held the funds
in a non-trust account and withheld distribution at her client's
insistence, to ensure the husband's compliance with other terms of the
divorce.80 In a separate matter, Brown represented a client in a civil
matter but caused the case to be dismissed without prejudice by not
complying with discovery obligations or responding to a motion to
compel.8 1 The court ordered a public reprimand and noted in mitigation
that all parties had been made whole and that Brown's lack of diligence
occurred at a time when her elderly father was ill.82

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

In re Morris, 298 Ga. 864, 785 S.E.2d 408 (2016).
In re Heitmann, 297 Ga. 280, 281, 773 S.E.2d 278, 279 (2015).
Id. at 280, 773 S.E.2d at 279.
In re Eddings, 298 Ga. 434, 434-35, 782 S.E.2d 445, 445 (2016).
In re Bell, 786 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 2016).
In re Bell, 299 Ga. 143, 787 S.E.2d 166 (2016).
In re Brown, 297 Ga. 865, 865, 778 S.E.2d 790, 791 (2015).
Id. at 865-66, 778 S.E.2d at 791.
Id. at 866-67, 778 S.E.2d at 792.
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The court accepted (over Justice Melton's dissent) a voluntary petition
for a public reprimand from Robert B. Eddleman, who conceded that he
violated Rule 1.783 regarding conflicts of interest and Rule 5.384
regarding non-lawyer assistants.85 Eddleman violated Rule 1.7 by
representing his secretary, with whom he had an intimate relationship
at the time and whom he later married, in her divorce proceeding while
he was simultaneously counsel of record for the secretary's husband in
an unrelated matter.8 6 The Rule 5.3 violation resulted from his failure to
train and supervise his secretary, who signed several documents
87
(including a release in favor of Eddleman) with her husband's name.
D.

Review PanelReprimands

The supreme court approved Review Panel reprimands for four
lawyers. A $40.95 trust account overdraft alerted the bar that Neville
Trevor Francis commingled personal and fiduciary funds in his "very
small, almost non-existent practice." 88 The court accepted his voluntary
petition for a Review Panel reprimand.89 The court accepted Nicholas
Pagano's petition for voluntary discipline in the form of a Review Panel
reprimand as discipline for having abandoned a personal injury client
and for not telling the client that the case had been dismissed as a result
of Pagano's failure to appear for two calendar calls.90 S. Carlton Rouse
received a Review Panel reprimand because he failed to return a client's
file and withdraw from a case, as instructed by the client, for two
months.9 1

Thomas J. Ford, III undertook to defend a client in a murder case and
knew he would need a forensic pathologist. 92 Ford assumed his client's
prior counsel would secure one, but when that turned out not to be true,
Ford neither consulted with the client about the effect on the case nor
83.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2016).

84. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2016).
85. In re Eddleman, 298 Ga. 469, 782 S.E.2d 668 (2016).
86. Id. at 469-70, 782 S.E.2d at 669. The Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, unlike
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, do not explicitly provide that it is a conflict of
interest for a lawyer to represent a client with whom the lawyer is involved in a sexual
relationship. The court in Eddleman's case, however, mentioned "this Court's repeated
admonitions against lawyers entering into extramarital relationships with clients . . . ." Id.
at 470, 782 S.E.2d at 669.
87. Id. at 470, 782 S.E.2d at 669.
88. In re Francis, 297 Ga. 282, 282, 773 S.E.2d 280, 281 (2015).
89. Id. at 283, 773 S.E.2d at 281.
90. In re Pagano, 298 Ga. 381, 382, 782 S.E.2d 42-43 (2016).
91. In re Rouse, 297 Ga. 500, 500, 775 S.E.2d 152, 153 (2015).
92. In re Ford, 297 Ga. 792, 792, 778 S.E.2d 227, 227 (2015).
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moved for a continuance.93 He admitted he was not ready for trial, and
his client was convicted (although new counsel later obtained a new trial
for her). 94 Ford's petition for a Review Panel reprimand was accepted,
and the court noted that, at the relevant time, Ford was undergoing the
dissolution of his marriage and was drinking to excess.95
E.

Other DisciplinaryMatters

The Georgia Supreme Court decided five miscellaneous cases related
to discipline. Joanna Temple pled guilty in New York to a misdemeanor
charge that resulted from her role as lead counsel for payday lending
companies, in which for over five years "she knowingly instructed and
encouraged her payday lending clients to intentionally violate certain
state lending laws ... and assisted them in doing so."9 6 The court rejected
her petition for voluntary discipline of a one-year suspension because of
the "very serious professional misconduct to which Temple has
admitted."9 7
Morris P. Fair, Jr. petitioned for a Review Panel reprimand as
discipline for lack of communication and diligence in his representation
of a habeas petitioner, but, in light of Fair's prior disciplinary history, the
court rejected that request.98 Several months later, the court rejected
Fair's second request for a review panel reprimand, for the same

reason.99

The court granted certificates of fitness for readmission to two lawyers.
Alvin Lamont Kendall was disbarred in 2003 after he was convicted in
federal court of conspiring to give a client advance notice of federal law
enforcement activities in connection with the client's drug ring.1 00 The
supreme court granted him a certificate of fitness for readmission,
finding that he had shown clear and convincing evidence of his
rehabilitation.1 01 Wallace Washington had been disbarred in 1998
because he returned client funds to someone not authorized to receive
them, rather than returning them to his client.1 02 Washington sought a
certificate of fitness for readmission, and the court granted it, noting that

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 792, 778 S.E.2d at 227-28.
Id. at 792, 778 S.E.2d at 228.
Id.
In re Temple, 299 Ga. 140, 140, 786 S.E.2d 684, 685 (2016).
Id. at 141, 786 S.E.2d at 686.
In re Fair, 297 Ga. 869, 870, 778 S.E.2d 794, 795 (2015).
In re Fair, 299 Ga. 10, 12, 785 S.E.2d 539, 541 (2016).
In re Kendall, 297 Ga. 798, 799, 778 S.E.2d 220, 220-21 (2015).
Id. at 800-01, 778 S.E.2d at 222.
In re Washington, 299 Ga. 142, 142, 786 S.E.2d 687, 687 (2016).
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he had demonstrated rehabilitation by his course of conduct during the
seventeen years since his disbarment. 103
The supreme court denied Jonathan Richard Huddleston a certificate
of fitness to practice law because, in his law school applications and his
application for certification of fitness:
[He] consistently chose to conceal, rather than disclose, his relevant
criminal background and academic history. He repeatedly gave false
answers to direct questions about his criminal and academic
background, and, even when directly confronted about his lack of
candor on numerous occasions, he still chose to omit relevant portions
104
of his record that should have been revealed from the beginning.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A. Cases in Which Claims of Ineffective Assistance Ultimately Prevailed
Georgia Supreme Court
1.
The supreme court granted relief in four cases based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Seabolt v. Norris 05 involved ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
in a murder case. The defendant, Norris, was convicted of murder after
she shot her father in the back of the head with a pistol.106 The habeas
court found four instances of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
107
The supreme court affirmed
but the supreme court affirmed only one.
the grant of habeas corpus because appellate counsel did not argue that
the trial court erred when it refused to charge the jury on the lesser8
included offense of involuntary manslaughter.10 Because there was
evidence that would have supported such a verdict (rather than malice
murder), and because the evidence for malice murder was not
overwhelming, it was likely that the conviction would have been reversed
9
if appellate counsel had made the argument.10 The supreme court held
0
that was ineffective assistance by appellate counsel."1

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 142-43, 786 S.E.2d at 688.
In re Huddleston, 297 Ga. 726, 731, 777 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2015).
298 Ga. 583, 783 S.E.2d 913 (2016).
Id. at 583, 783 S.E.2d at 915.
Id.
Id. at 586, 783 S.E.2d at 917.
Id. at 586-87, 783 S.E.2d at 917.
Id.
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In State v. Garland,"'1the supreme court affirmed the grant of habeas
corpus to a man who had been convicted of sexual battery involving a
child. Garland's trial counsel did not investigate or present evidence of
Garland's serious mental problems, which could have led either to a
ruling that Garland was not competent to stand trial or perhaps not
criminally responsible for his actions. 112 Garland, therefore, had a viable
claim of ineffective assistance at trial, but Garland's second counsel
waived the right to pursue those claims without Garland's consent in
exchange for an agreement by the state to allow Garland to serve his
probation in Texas.113 The supreme court held that waiving the right to
claim that trial counsel was ineffective, especially without the consent of
Garland, was ineffective assistance by Garland's second lawyer. 114 The
court therefore affirmed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. 115
Hillman v. Johnson11 6 involved ineffective assistance in connection
with sentencing. The prisoner, Hillman, had a prior felony conviction and
was convicted of armed robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in a home invasion that
netted seven dollars and a cell phone.1 17 The trial court felt itself
constrained by Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.G.G.A.) section 1710-7(a) 118 (the mandatory minimum sentencing statute for felony
recidivists) to sentence Hillman to the maximum time authorized for
armed robbery (life), burglary (twenty years), and aggravated assault
(twenty years). 119 The supreme court affirmed the trial court and,
therefore, Hillman's counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue to the
contrary. 120 However, the trial court also felt compelled to sentence
Hillman to the maximum time allowed for the felon-in-possession charge,
five years, even though the statute regarding felon-in-possession (which
was enacted after the recidivist statute) provided for a sentencing range
of one to five years. 121 As the supreme court recognized, an automatic
sentence under the recidivist statute of five years for a felon in possession
would nullify the sentencing range the legislature set for that charge

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

298 Ga. 482, 781 S.E.2d 787 (2016).
Id. at 484, 781 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 483, 781 S.E.2d at 788.
Id. at 484, 781 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 487, 781 S.E.2d at 791.
297 Ga. 609, 774 S.E.2d 615 (2015).
Id. at 610, 774 S.E.2d at 616.
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) (Supp. 2016).
Hillman, 297 Ga. at 610, 774 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 614, 774 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 610, 774 S.E.2d at 617.
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because, by definition, all defendants convicted of being a felon in
possession are felons who would be subject to the recidivist statute.122
The supreme court deemed trial counsel's failure to argue against an
automatic five years on the felon in possession charge ineffective
assistance, and the supreme court remanded the case for resentencing on
that charge.1 23
In Chatman v. Walker,124 the supreme court affirmed a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the sentencing phase
of a death penalty case. Trial counsel hired a mitigation specialist
"without any investigation into his qualifications and then delegated to
him responsibility for the mitigation investigation without sufficient
supervision."l 25 When it became clear, on the eve of trial, that the
mitigation specialist had not conducted a proper investigation, trial
counsel failed to ask for a continuance.1 26 The defects in the investigation
were exacerbated by a deficient presentation in which the "specialist"
testified about, among other things, "the alignment of the planets" in the
defendant's life, puzzling jurors and startling the judge.1 27 The supreme
court agreed the defendant was prejudiced by these failures, because a
later investigation revealed a deeply disturbing history of domestic
violence and physical abuse in the defendant's upbringing that, if it had
been presented at the sentencing phase of the trial, would have had a
reasonable probability of changing the result.1 28
2.
Georgia Court of Appeals
The court of appeals granted relief in five cases based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In Bolden v. State,129 the court of appeals held the defendant's trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to object to a
variance between the indictment and the judge's explanation of the
charge in response to a jury question.13 0 The defendant was convicted of
multiple crimes, including burglary of the home of a woman with whom
he had three children."'1 The indictment alleged that he committed
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124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 611, 774 S.E.2d at 618.
Id. at 614-15, 774 S.E.2d at 619-20.
297 Ga. 191, 773 S.E.2d 192 (2015).
Id. at 202, 773 S.E.2d at 200.
Id. at 203-204, 773 S.E.2d at 201.
Id. at 204, 773 S.E.2d at 201.
Id. at 209-10, 773 S.E.2d at 205.
335 Ga. App. 653, 782 S.E.2d 708 (2016).
Id. at 653, 782 S.E.2d at 710.
Id.
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burglary by entering the dwelling with the intent to commit a felony, but
the judge told the jury that it could find the defendant committed
burglary if he had the intent to commit a felony, not just at the time he
entered the house, but also when he entered "any room or part of it." 132

The defendant testified that he entered the home with the intent only to
talk to the victim.

13 3

The court of appeals held there was a reasonable

probability that the result of the burglary charge would have been
different if trial counsel had objected to the judge's deviation from the
indictment, and therefore the court ordered a new trial on that count. 134
In the Interest of S.B.135 involved the termination of parental rights.
Parents in such cases have the right to effective assistance of counsel. 136
In this case, a putative father's attorney neglected to take steps to
legitimate the child and as a result the juvenile court's decision was
dictated by his lack of standing to assert his parental rights. 137 The
juvenile court terminated the father's parental rights, and the court of
appeals found he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. 138 The
court remanded the case and gave the father thirty days to file the
petition to legitimatize the children.139
In Everhart v. State,140 the defendant was convicted of three counts of
cruelty to children. The court of appeals held Everhart received
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to one of those counts, which
alleged he had deprived his child of "necessary sustenance" by failing to
seek medical care for the child.141 The indictment was void, because
under Georgia law "necessary sustenance" does not include medical
care.1 42 To charge Everhart with cruelty for failure to seek medical care,
the indictment needed to charge him under a different part of the statute
and allege that by doing so he had maliciously caused the child cruel or
excessive physical or mental pain.1 43 Because trial counsel did not demur
to the indictment, and as a result Everhart was convicted of actions that
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133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 656, 782 S.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 658, 782 S.E.2d at 713.
Id. at 658-59, 782 S.E.2d at 713-14.
335 Ga. App. 1, 780 S.E.2d 520 (2015).
See, e.g., In the Interest of S.N.H., 300 Ga. App. 321, 329, 685 S.E.2d 290, 298 (2009).
In the Interest of S.B., 335 Ga. App. at 5, 780 S.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 5-6, 780 S.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 11, 780 S.E.2d at 529.
337 Ga. App. 348, 786 S.E.2d 866 (2016).
Id. at 353, 786 S.E.2d at 872-873.
Id. at 354, 786 S.E.2d at 873.
Id.
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do not constitute a crime in Georgia, the court of appeals reversed that
part of his conviction.144

In Blackmon v. State,145 a rape case, the. only evidence linking the
defendant to the crimes alleged was the testimony of the victim. Yet
during trial, the prosecution was allowed, without objection from defense
counsel, to present six witnesses who testified about hearsay statements
that the defendant had made describing what the defendant had done to
her. 146 None of these statements fit within an exception to the hearsay
rule, and defense counsel testified that she did not object because she was
a "bonehead," "worn out," and "overwhelmed." 1 47 To compound the
problem, trial counsel also did not object to a jury instruction that the
jury could consider those hearsay statements as "substantive evidence,"
nor did counsel object when the victim's mother testified as to her
daughter's truthfulness. 148 Because the prosecution's other evidence was
limited to the victim's testimony, and because each of these inexplicable
errors by defense counsel related to that testimony, the court of appeals
found that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel.149

Dumas v. State5 0 was a rape and child molestation case in which the
prosecutor repeatedly asked the defendant on the stand whether he had
ever denied the victim's allegations and, in closing argument, used the
defendant's silence upon his arrest against him: "You're getting picked
up on a rape warrant. Scream it from the mountaintops, I didn't do it.

144. Id. at 355, 786 S.E.2d at 874.
145. 336 Ga. App. 387, 785 S.E.2d 59 (2016).
146. Id. at 389, 785 S.E.2d at 62.
147. Id. at 390, 785 S.E.2d at 62.
148. Id. at 394, 785 S.E.2d at 65.
149. Id. at 395-96, 785 S.E.2d at 66. Judge Rickman wrote a special concurrence in this
case that received much attention. In that opinion, after he acknowledged the difficulties
of doing criminal defense work, the judge wrote:
[T]here are three obligations that continue to be ignored by some practicing
members of the Georgia bar. First, there is an obligation for the lawyer who feels
burned out and ineffective to recognize it and either withdraw from a case or
seek other assistance until the lawyer is prepared to perform competently. ...
Second, there is an obligation on the part of any lawyer who may be responsible
for supervising a struggling lawyer to recognize when that lawyer needs
assistance and/or to be replaced. . . . Third, there is an obligation on our
profession to keep an ineffective attorney out of the courtroom until he or she is
fully prepared to provide competent representation ... In a number of cases that
have come before this Court, none of the foregoing obligations appeared to have
been taken as seriously as they should have been.
Id. at 396-397, 785 S.E.2d at 67 (Rickman, J., concurring).
150. 337 Ga. App. 124, 786 S.E.2d 508 (2016).
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But nothing."'15 Defense counsel objected every time the prosecutor
sought to introduce evidence of the defendant's silence and eventually
the court said in front of the jury, "He has a right to remain silent." 152
However, for no reason that trial counsel could recall, he did not object to
the prosecutor's improper comment during closing argument on the
defendant's silence.1 53 The court of appeals concluded that there was no
strategic reason not to object and therefore this was deficient
performance by defense counsel. 154 The court of appeals reversed the
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel because it found
prejudice, based both upon the deliberate misconduct of the prosecutor to
convince the jury to hold the defendant's post-arrest silence against him
and the lack of overwhelming evidence favoring conviction. 155
B. Findingsof Ineffective Assistance Reversed
The supreme court reversed one finding of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In Williams v. Rudolph,156 the defendant had been indicted for
rape and other charges but not for statutory rape. Over trial counsel's
objection, the trial court instructed the jury on statutory rape as a lesser
included offense of rape.15 7 The jury convicted Rudolph of statutory rape
(and other charges) but not of rape. 15 8 Appellate counsel did not raise the
judge's instruction on statutory rape as error, and the habeas court found
this was ineffective assistance of counsel under the law as it existed at
the time of the habeas decision.15 9 The supreme court reversed, however,
because the standard should have been the state of the law at the time of
the direct appeal, and at that time the impropriety of the charge of
statutory rape as a lesser included offense of rape was not clear.160 The
supreme court concluded "there is no requirement for an attorney to
prognosticate future law in order to render effective representation."1 6 1
The Georgia Court of Appeals also reversed one finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In State v. Reynolds, 162 the defendant was
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154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 127, 786 S.E.2d at 511.
Id. at 126, 786 S.E.2d at 510.
Id. at 127, 786 S.E.2d at 510-11.
Id. at 127-28, 786 S.E.2d at 511.
Id. at 129-30, 786 S.E.2d at 512.
298 Ga. 86, 777 S.E.2d 472 (2015).
Id. at 87, 777 S.E.2d at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89, 777 S.E.2d at 474.
Id.
332 Ga. App. 818, 775 S.E.2d 187 (2015).
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convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, and other crimes, perpetrated
in the course of a home invasion, but the trial court ordered a new trial
on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. One of the items of
evidence against the defendant was a thumbprint on the outside of a
stolen car that contained items taken from the victims.163 Trial counsel
presented the theory that the thumbprint was there because Reynolds
sold drugs to occupants of the car and touched the outside of the car
during that transaction. 164 Apparently to buttress that theory, trial
counsel elicited testimony from Reynolds about his prior convictions for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.16 5 The court of appeals held
the decision to present this evidence was part of a trial strategy, and that
strategy was not so far-fetched that no competent attorney would choose
to employ it. 166 Therefore, the court concluded the trial court incorrectly
ordered a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.' 6 7

C.

Miscellaneous Ineffective Assistance Cases

In Pyatt v. State,1 68 the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault
and felony murder in connection with the death of a victim who was shot
while he was driving a car. A detective testified that, in his opinion, one
of the shots fired by the defendant was an aggravated assault because
the shot was fired "in the direction of the car, over the car."169 Defense
counsel did not object to this testimony even though it was improper as
an opinion about the ultimate issue. 7 0 Defense counsel testified there
was no strategic reason not to object, but rather he "just missed it."171 In

a four-to-three decision, the supreme court held the defendant had not
made a sufficient showing of prejudice from this error of trial counsel,
particularly because defense counsel elicited substantially the same
testimony on cross-examination and impeached the basis of the
detective's opinion.1 72 It was also important to the majority that the jury
naturally would have inferred the detective's opinion because the
defendant was charged with aggravated assault, the detective testified "I
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168.
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Id. at 819, 775 S.E.2d at 188.
Id. at 820, 775 S.E.2d at 189.
Id. at 821, 775 S.E.2d at 190.
Id. at 823, 775 S.E.2d at 191.
Id.
298 Ga. 742, 784 S.E.2d 759 (2016).
Id. at 754, 784 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 755, 784 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 759, 784 S.E.2d at 773 (Hines, J., dissenting).
Id. at 756-57, 784 S.E.2d at 771-72 (majority opinion).
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don't determine the guilt part,"1 73 the opinion apparently was not used in
closing argument, and the trial court likely would have responded to any
ultimate issue objection with a curative instruction. 174 Three justices
dissented and argued that the detective's testimony intruded on the
jury's role to determine whether the shot, described variously as "at,"
"toward," and "over" the car, was made with the required intent to cause
violent injury and that there was a reasonable probability that the jury
considered the detective's improper testimony with respect to all the
charges. 175
In Tolbert v. State, 7 6 a unanimous supreme court rejected a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel despite the fact that one lawyer
represented two murder defendants (described in the opinion as "Leroy"
and Tolbert") at the same trial and the clients did not waive any conflict
of interest. The court noted the obvious serious potential for conflict but
reiterated prior holdings that concurrent representation of co-defendants
is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel.' 77 The court recognized
there was evidence of two alarming facts: the lawyer was paid to
represent both defendants by Leroy, and the lawyer met alone with
Leroy, but met with Tolbert only when both defendants were present. 178
The court downplayed the credibility of that evidence but ultimately
decided the case on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that
any conflict of interest adversely affected the lawyer's representation of
both.1 79 The court specifically rejected the arguments that the lawyer
gave priority in plea negotiations to Leroy and that the lawyer chose not
to argue Tolbert was less culpable than Leroy because of a conflict of
interest.180 Instead, the court concluded the "defenses of Tolbert and
Leroy were perfectly compatible" and therefore found that there had been
no ineffective assistance of counsel.' 8
Marshall v. Statel82 was a murder case in which at one or more points
defense counsel was at best inattentive and at worst asleep.1 83 In the one
instance of inattention noted by the trial court, defense counsel put his
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Id. at 757, 784 S.E.2d at 771.
Id. at 755, 757-58, 784 S.E.2d at 770-71.
Id. at 759-61, 784 S.E.2d at 774 (Hines, J., dissenting).
298 Ga. 147, 780 S.E.2d 298 (2015).
Id. at 148-49, 780 S.E.2d at 302.
Id. at 151-52, 780 S.E.2d at 304.
Id. at 153, 780 S.E.2d at 305.
Id. at 154, 780 S.E.2d at 305.
Id. at 157, 780 S.E.2d at 307.
297 Ga. 445, 774 S.E.2d 675 (2015).
Id. at 450, 774 S.E.2d at 680.
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head down on counsel table while the recording of the defendant's
interview with investigators was played for the jury. 184 Although the
supreme court agreed such inattentiveness was "outside professional
norms," the court held Marshall had failed to show that any improper
evidence was introduced as a result.185 Therefore, the court rejected the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.186
Wiley v. State18 7 raised an interesting issue about the duties of counsel
in counseling a client about a plea offer. Wiley declined a plea offer and
was convicted at trial. 18 8 She claimed her counsel rendered ineffective
assistance because, although he counseled her about the strength of the
evidence against her and the difference between the plea offer and the
likely sentence if she was convicted, her attorney did not advise her
specifically to accept or reject the offer.1 89 The court of appeals held that
this was within the range of acceptable representation and quoted the
following language from the Georgia Supreme Court:
[a] n attorney ordinarily may satisfy the duty to provide informed legal
advice regarding a plea offer by discussing with the accused the risks
of going to trial, the evidence against him or her, and difference in
possible sentences that would be imposed following a guilty plea and
following a conviction at trial. 190

Because the court found there was nothing deficient in counsel's
representation, it did not reach the question of prejudice. 191 In a
concurrence, Judge McFadden agreed with the result but argued that the
case should have been decided after assuming, but not deciding, that
counsel was in fact deficient for not offering "bottom-line" advice.1 92
Judge McFadden noted that in 2009 the Georgia Supreme Court quoted
language from the United States Supreme Court that an accused is
entitled to rely on counsel "to offer his informed opinion as to what plea
should be entered." 193 To avoid having to decide whether this language
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Id.
Id. at 451, 774 S.E.2d at 680-81.
Id.
336 Ga. App. 641, 782 S.E.2d 850 (2016).
Id. at 641, 782 S.E.2d at 851.
Id. at 641-43, 782 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 643, 782 S.E.2d at 853 (quoting Cammer v. Walker, 290 Ga. 251, 255, 719
437, 441 (2011)).
Id. at 644 n.5, 782 S.E.2d at 853 n.5.
Id. at 646, 782 S.E.2d at 854 (McFadden, J., concurring).
Id. at 645, 782 S.E.2d at 854 (quoting Cleveland v. State, 285 Ga. 142, 44, 674
289, 291 (2009)).

2016}

LEGAL ETHICS

187

requires such "bottom-line" advice in all cases, Judge McFadden urged
that Wiley's case should have been decided on the basis of lack of
prejudice. 194
IV. LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Georgia appellate courts decided five cases involving legal malpractice
or fiduciary duty during the survey period.
In Alston & Bird LLP v. Hatcher Management Holdings, LLC,19 5
Alston & Bird was the sole defendant in a case alleging legal malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duty and filed notice that, at trial, it would seek
to show the plaintiffs damages, if any, were caused in whole or in part
by the actions of the plaintiff and others. The trial court struck the notice,
but the court of appeals reversed that ruling and held, under recent
supreme court precedent, that even in such a single defendant case, the
law firm had the right to try to prove that fault should be apportioned. 9 6
Tucker v. Rogers 97 involved a personal injury case that was never
filed. The attorney attempted unsuccessfully to settle the case and then
sought the client's authorization to file the case. 198 When the lawyer's call
to the client's home number revealed the number had been changed, and
the client did not answer two calls to his cell phone, the lawyer sought
authority to sue in a letter to which the client never responded, and which
the client claimed never to have received.1 99 The lawyer did not file suit
but, after the statute of limitations expired, settled the case without the
client's authorization. 200 The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's
order regarding partial summary judgment and held there was no
genuine issue of material fact that the lawyer violated the standard of
care by settling the case without authority or that the would-be
defendant in the underlying case would have been found liable for the
accident. 201 The court held there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether the attorney's failure to file the case before the statute
of limitations expired violated the standard of care and what, if any,
damages the plaintiff suffered as a result of any breaches of the lawyer's
duty of care. 202

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 646, 782 S.E.2d at 854.
336 Ga. App. 527, 785 S.E.2d 541 (2016).
Id. at 530, 785 S.E.2d at 544.
334 Ga. App. 58, 778 S.E.2d 795 (2015).
Id. at 59, 778 S.E.2d at 796-97.
Id. at 59, 778 S.E.2d at 797.
Id. at 59-60, 778 S.E.2d at 797.
Id. at 60-61, 778 S.E.2d at 797-98.
Id. at 63-64, 778 S.E.2d at 799.
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In Hines v. Holland,203 an attorney hired a non-lawyer title examiner
to do the title examination on a piece of real property. The title report did
not show one of the security deeds on the property, and as a result of
reliance on that report, the lawyer gave an incorrect legal opinion about
encumbrances on the property. 204 A title insurer issued a policy in
reliance on the lawyer's opinion and eventually had to pay over $140,000
to prevent foreclosure by the creditor, who was not identified in the title
report or the lawyer's legal opinion. 205 The title company sued the lawyer,
and the lawyer attempted to bring in the title examiner as a third-party
defendant. 206 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
the third-party claim, holding the lawyer's "third-party" claims were not
for contribution or indemnity and thus were not "derivative" claims as
required by third-party practice. 207 Of particular note is the court's
reasoning that the lawyer's liability to the insurance company was not
"vicarious" (imputed liability for the negligence of the title examiner)
because "only [the lawyer] can render a legal opinion on the status of title
to property, and [the lawyer] is directly responsible to his client for his
opinion on the status of the title .. . .."208
In Jim Tidwell Ford, Inc. v. Bashuk,209 the court of appeals affirmed
summary judgment for defendants in a legal malpractice case. 210 The
plaintiff (Tidwell Ford) had been a defendant in a personal injury case
brought by Charles Chase. The defendants, Jeffrey Alan Bashuk and
Bashuk & Glickman (collectively Bashuk), represented Tidwell Ford in
Chase's case. Chase won the personal injury case, and Tidwell Ford
appealed, but during the pendency of the appeal, Chase and Tidwell Ford
settled. 211 The court of appeals held that Tidwell Ford's decision to settle
the underlying case cut off its right to pursue its malpractice and breach
of fiduciary duty claims because Tidwell Ford still had a viable chance to
obtain reversal of the judgment. 212 Additionally, by settling, Tidwell Ford
severed any proximate cause between the damages it agreed to pay in
settlement and the alleged malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty of

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

334 Ga. App. 292, 779 S.E.2d 63 (2015).
Id. at 292, 779 S.E.2d at 65.
Id.
Id. at 293, 779 S.E.2d at 65.
Id. at 294, 779 S.E.2d at 66.
Id. at 297, 779 S.E.2d at 68.
335 Ga. App. 668, 782 S.E.2d 721 (2016).
Id. at 668, 782 S.E.2d at 722.
Id. at 668-69, 782 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 670-71, 782 S.E.2d at 724.
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Bashuk. 213 The court of appeals noted that this rule may not be wise as a
matter of policy:
Other policy considerations might suggest a different rule. A rule that
requires would-be legal malpractice plaintiffs to exhaust all possible
appeals in the underlying matter would appear to force those parties
to risk increasing their own damages just so they can later pursue an
uncertain malpractice remedy. However, binding precedent provides
the rule we employ here. 214
Because the court of appeals determined that Tidwell Ford had a viable
chance of obtaining reversal of the underlying judgment, the court of
appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Bashuk. 215
In Helms & Greene, LLC v. Willis,216 the court of appeals held that an
agent forfeits any right to compensation for the period in which the agent
breaches his or her fiduciary duties to the principal. 2 17 The case states a
general proposition of agency law and just happens to involve a lawyer
who allegedly breached fiduciary duties to his law firm. 218 The case is
significant, however, because it draws attention to the doctrine that a
lawyer may forfeit, or be obliged to disgorge legal fees to a client when
the lawyer breaches a fiduciary duty, regardless of whether the lawyer
causes any actual harm to the client. 219
V.

JUDICIAL ETHICS
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Post v. State involved three related felony murder convictions in
Cobb County. Before trial, one defendant filed a verified motion to recuse
the trial judge because the trial judge had been employed by the district
attorney's office when the case was brought and because the district
attorney was listed as the judge's campaign treasurer. 221 The Georgia
Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, the trial judge was
required to refer the recusal motion to another judge. 222 On its face, the
motion was timely, and the verification of the motion served as

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id. at 670 n.3, 782 S.E.2d at 724 n.3.
Id. at 673, 782 S.E.2d at 726.
333 Ga. App. 396, 773 S.E.2d 491 (2015).
Id. at 399-400, 773 S.E.2d at 494-95.
Id.
Id. at 401, 773 S.E.2d at 495. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999).
298 Ga. 241, 779 S.E.2d 624 (2015).
Id. at 241-42, 779 S.E.2d at 627.
Id. at 244-45, 779 S.E.2d at 628-29.
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judge's election. 224 However, the district attorney's status as campaign
treasurer raised an inference of a strong enough relationship that the
motion should have been referred. 225 The supreme court remanded the
case for consideration by another judge, with the statement that the
conviction would stand if it was determined that recusal was unnecessary
but that the case would have to be retried if the judge was disqualified

after all. 226

The supreme court reached a slightly different result as to the other
two defendants. 227 When they sought the judge's recusal, the judge
engaged the lawyers in a colloquy on the record about the merits of the
228
motion instead of simply referring it to another judge for decision.
Because this improper self-defense itself created an appearance of
partiality on the part of the judge, the supreme court reversed the
convictions and remanded the cases for new trials in front of a different
trial judge. 229
In Beasley v. State,230 the trial judge allegedly had a conflict of interest
due to marriage at the time of trial to a lawyer in the district attorney's
office. The court of appeals in an earlier appeal had remanded the case
for a determination of whether the defendant raised the conflict in a
timely manner, but instead the state stipulated to a retrial before a
different judge. 231 The court of appeals held this procedure was
appropriate and did not violate the defendant's right against double
jeopardy, since he was subject to retrial even if he had been given the
opportunity to show that he had raised the judge's conflict of interest in
232
connection with the first trial in a timely manner.
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Id. at 253, 779 S.E.2d at 633.
Id. at 248-50, 779 S.E.2d at 631-32.
Id. at 249, 779 S.E.2d at 632.
Id. at 253, 779 S.E.2d at 634.
Id. at 258, 779 S.E.2d at 637-38.
Id. at 254-55, 779 S.E.2d at 635-36.
Id. at 258, 779 S.E.2d at 637-38.
335 Ga. App. 530, 782 S.E.2d 315 (2016).
Id. at 532-33, 782 S.E.2d at 318.
Id. at 534-35, 782 S.E.2d at 319-20.
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In Price v. Reish, 233 the court of appeals dealt with questions relating
to judicial recusal. A trial judge and an attorney had a history, including
litigation in which the attorney represented parties in litigation
involving the estate of the judge's sister. 234 The judge routinely
disqualified herself in cases involving this attorney. 235 In this particular
case, however, the attorney entered an appearance and filed a motion to
recuse with the required affidavit, but the judge declined to recuse,
instead vacating the lawyer's entry of appearance in the case because the
lawyer "hired into a conflict" for the purpose of judge shopping. 236 The
court of appeals reversed and remanded because, under these
circumstances, the judge was required to assign the recusal motion to a
different judge. 237 The court of appeals went on, however, to warn against
counsel engaging in the practice of accepting representation with the
intent of causing the judge's recusal. 238 The court of appeals wrote that
such actions would violate the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct and
would permit the judge assigned to the recusal motion to deny it and
sanction the lawyer, including the sanction of disqualification in the
case. 239

State v. Ozment 24 0 involved a judge who overstepped his bounds in
connection with a plea. The defendant faced four counts, entered a nonnegotiated guilty plea as to one of them, and asked the judge to dismiss
the remaining counts. 241 The prosecutor objected, but the judge overruled
the objection, stating, "I've just negotiated it. Thank you for your
objection. I will go ahead and I will accept the plea." 242 The court of

appeals held the judge violated the rule against judicial involvement in
plea negotiations and had no legal basis for dismissing the remaining
counts. 243 Rather, the judge's actions interfered with the prosecutor's
right to decide what charges to bring.244
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335 Ga. App. 491, 780 S.E.2d 745 (2015).
Id. at 492, 780 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 491-92, 780 S.E.2d at 746.
Id. at 494, 780 S.E.2d at 747.
Id. at 496-97, 780 S.E.2d at 749.
Id. at 495, 780 S.E.2d at 748.
Id. at 495-96, 780 S.E.2d at 748-49.
333 Ga. App. 82, 775 S.E.2d 564 (2015).
Id. at 82, 775 S.E.2d at 565.
Id. at 82-83, 775 S.E.2d at 565.
Id. at 84, 775 S.E.2d at 566.
Id.
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VI. MISCELLANEOUS CASES

Georgia appellate courts decided seven miscellaneous cases involving
issues of legal ethics during the survey period.
In Neuman v. State,245 the supreme court reversed a murder conviction
because the trial court allowed the state to discover and use information
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Defense counsel hired two
professionals as consultants to interview the client to determine whether
an insanity defense would be appropriate. 246 The professionals reported
back to the lawyer, who hired someone else to be the expert witness. 247
The trial court permitted discovery of the notes of the consultants. 248 The
supreme court found that this was error because the attorney-client
privilege protected the notes:
Consistent with this general principle, and after a review of authority
from other states on this issue, we join numerous other jurisdictions
in holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential
communications, related to the matters on which legal advice is being
sought, between the attorneys, their agents, or their client, and an
expert engaged by the attorney to aid in the client's representation;
the privilege is not waived if the expert will neither serve as a witness
at trial nor provide any basis for the formulation of other experts' trial
testimony.

249

The court rejected the argument that assertion of an insanity defense
waives the attorney-client privilege. 250 The court also rejected, over the
dissent of Justice Melton, the argument that the attorney-client privilege
did not apply because a form used by one of the consultants was
conclusive evidence that the conversations were not intended to be
confidential. 251
Martin v. State252 involved an unusual application of the advocatewitness disqualification rule. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to
murder and other charges and to waive jury trial for sentencing,
allegedly in reliance on an off-the-record statement by the trial judge that
she would not impose the death penalty. 253 When the trial judge did

245. 297Ga. 501, 773 S.E.2d 716 (2015).
246. Id. at 502-03, 773 S.E.2d at 719.
247. Id. at 503, 773 S.E.2d at 719.

248. Id.
249. Id. at 504, 773 S.E.2d at 720.
250. Id. at 509, 773 S.E.2d at 723.
251. Id. at 508, 773 S.E.2d at 721-22.

252. 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (2015).
253. Id. at 266-67, 779 S.E.2d at 352-53.
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impose the death penalty, Martin's lawyers filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and for a new trial, based upon the trial judge's alleged
statements. 254 Those motions were referred to another judge, who
disqualified Martin's trial counsel from acting as advocates for his
motions because they would be necessary witnesses to the original trial
judge's alleged statements. 255 Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct
3.7(a) sets forth a general rule (with exceptions) against lawyers acting
as both necessary witnesses and advocates at trial. 256 The most common
(but not the only) basis for applying this rule is to protect against jurors
being confused about the dual roles of counsel who are both advocates
and witnesses. 257 The supreme court found no abuse of discretion in
disqualifying the lawyers even though the matter for which the lawyers
were disqualified was to be before the new judge rather than a jury. 258
The supreme court held this case involved the "extraordinary
circumstance" where the judge felt the need to disqualify the lawyers to
ensure proper advocacy for Martin. 259
Smith v. WilliamS 260 relates to a dispute that arose in connection with
a law firm breakup over attorneys' fees in workers' compensation cases.
The court of appeals affirmed two rulings of the trial court. 261 First, the
court held the superior court rather than the State Board of Workers'
Compensation had jurisdiction over the dispute, because the dispute was
not between an employer and employee nor was it ancillary (in the sense
that the employee's rights were at stake) to any such dispute. 262 Second,
the court upheld the denial of partial summary judgment as to certain
disputed fees, even though no attorneys' fee liens had been filed with the
Board because the fees in question may have been earned before the law
firm partnership dissolved. 263

254. Id. at 267, 779 S.E.2d at 353.
255. Id.
256. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2016).
257. See, e.g., ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 405 (Ellen J.
Bennett et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015) ("When a lawyer takes on both roles, jurors are likely to
be confused about 'whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or
as an analysis of the proof."').
258. Martin, 298 Ga. at 271, 779 S.E.2d at 355.
259. Id. at 271-72, 779 S.E.2d at 355-56.
260. 333 Ga. App. 167, 775 S.E.2d 639 (2015).
261. Id. at 168, 167 S.E.2d at 641.
262. Id. at 168-69, 167 S.E.2d at 641.
263. Id. at 169-71, 167 S.E.2d at 642-43. The court of appeals also reversed the superior
court with respect to case-specific order modifying an injunction to place certain fees in
escrow. Id. at 171-73, 167 S.E.2d at 643-44.
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Kemp v. Green264 involved the disqualification of counsel. In a related
case, Kemp sued Wellstar Health Systems and was represented by Gary
Brunch. 265 In that underlying case, the attorneys for the hospital
(collectively "Green & Sapp") had been disqualified because they caused
the withdrawal of Kemp's expert witness by contacting the expert's
employer. 266 Brunch represented Kemp in connection with those
disqualification proceedings. 267 In Kemp v. Green, Kemp (again
represented by Brunch) sued Green & Sapp for tortiously interfering
with the expert witness.

26

8 Green & Sapp convinced the trial court to

269

The court of appeals vacated that order and
disqualify Brunch.
remanded, noting that disqualification was premature until the trial
court determined that Kemp had stated a claim and that Brunch would
be an essential witness. 270
In Edwards v. State,271 the court of appeals rejected a double jeopardy
claim from a defendant whose earlier trial for rape and child molestation
ended in a court-declared mistrial because defense counsel alerted the
court to a conflict of interest. 272 Defense counsel had, at one time,
represented the victim's mother, who was expected to be a witness in the
case. 273 Defense counsel informed the court that he had confidential

information about the mother that would be strong impeachment
material. 274 Defense counsel could not use that confidential information
against his former client. 275 Edwards purported to waive the conflict, but
the court of appeals found that his waiver alone would not cure the
conflict (the former client also had to waive it and had not done so), the
consent was not in writing, and defense counsel had not given Edwards
276
Because the trial
information in writing about risks and alternatives.
counsel had a
defense
which
in
a
situation
court was confronted with
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337 Ga. App. 108, 786 S.E.2d 503 (2016).
Id. at 108, 786 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. at 109, 786 S.E.2d at 504.
Id.
Id. at 108-09, 786 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. at 109, 786 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. at 109, 786 S.E.2d at 505.
336 Ga. App. 595, 784 S.E.2d 924 (2016).
Id. at 595, 784 S.E.2d at 926.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 597-98, 784 S.E.2d at 927.
Id. at 599, 784 S.E.2d at 928.
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serious, unresolved conflict of interest, the mistrial resulted from
"manifest necessity" and thus did not bar retrial. 277
In Murphy v. Freeman,278 the court of appeals assessed sanctions
against counsel whose brief the court described as follows: "To
characterize Murphy's brief as poorly supported by legal authority would
be accurate; to characterize the brief as cogent would be an untruth." 279
What led to the sanctions, however, was not the abysmal quality of the
brief but rather the repeated ad hominem (and admittedly irrelevant)
attacks that the brief made on judges and others. 280 The court of appeals
reminded counsel of the Georgia Lawyer's Creed, which calls for
"dignified" disputes, "respect," and "candor." 281 The court also mentioned
Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which forbids a lawyer from
taking an action for a client "when the lawyer knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another." 282 Ultimately, the court of appeals assessed sanctions under its
own Court of Appeals Rule 10: "Personal remarks, whether oral or
written, which are discourteous or disparaging to any judge, opposing
counsel, or any court, are strictly forbidden." 283
In Woodham v. Atlanta Development Authority, 284 the court of appeals
reversed the trial court in connection with one aspect of a contempt
order. 285 The trial court had held an attorney in contempt for violation of
post-judgment discovery orders. 286 As a condition of purging the
contempt, the trial court ordered the attorney to pay the attorney's fees
incurred by his opposing party in connection with the contempt motion. 287
The court of appeals reversed that part of the contempt order because
those fees were not part of any previous order issued and disobeyed by
the attorney. 288
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Id. at 600, 784 S.E.2d at 929.
337 Ga. App. 221, 787 S.E.2d 755 (2016).
Id. at 224, 787 S.E.2d at 759.
Id. at 226, 787 S.E.2d at 759.
Id. at 228, 787 S.E.2d at 761.
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Id. at 227, 787 S.E.2d 760.
335 Ga. App. 126, 779 S.E.2d 116 (2015).
Id. at 131, 779 S.E.2d at 121.
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VII. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS
During the Survey period, the Formal Advisory Opinion Board took
two noteworthy actions. First, the Board suspended its work on an
opinion regarding conflicts of interest and part-time prosecutors because
the State Bar of Georgia Disciplinary Rules and Procedures Committee
undertook to deal with the issue by an amendment to Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.7.289 That proposed amendment makes an
exception for part-time prosecutors from the rule that a lawyer may not
without consent represent a client that is adverse to an existing client in
an unrelated matter. 290 Second, the Board approved for publication
proposed Advisory Opinion 15-R1, which concludes that "[a] sole
practitioner may not use a firm name that includes 'group' or '&
Associates' because both terms would incorrectly imply that the sole
practitioner practices with other lawyers. However, a sole practitioner
291
may use a firm name that includes 'firm."'
VIII. AMENDMENTS TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
On July 9, 2015, the supreme court approved amendments to Rules
1.6(b)(3), 3.5(c) and (d) and comment 7, 7.3(c) and comments 2, 3, 7 and
8, and 8.4(d). 292 The amendment to Rule 1.6(b)(3) clarifies that a lawyer's
duty to attempt to persuade the client not to act, or to warn a victim,
before revealing confidential information applies only in connection with
certain confidentiality exceptions and not others. 293 Rule 3.5 and its
comments were amended to add restrictions on when counsel may
294
The amendments
communicate with jurors after discharge of the jury.
to Rule 7.3 and its comments, in recognition of the proliferation of out-ofstate internet referral services, delete the requirement that the State Bar
295
These amendments require
of Georgia certify lawyer referral services.
Georgia lawyers simply to make sure that their use of referral services
296
The
does not violate any Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct.
supreme court amended Rule 8.4 to clarify that it is not a "violation" of

289. 2016 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supranote 2, at 7.
290. See 21 GA. B.J. 82 (June 2016).
291. 21 GA. B.J. 76 (Apr. 2016).
292. The court's order is available at https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsand
professionalism/upload/ Supreme-Court-Orders.pdf.
293. 2016 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supranote 2, at 16.
294. Id. at 17-18.
295. Id. at 23.
296. Id.
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the rules (and therefore it is not misconduct) for a lawyer not to comply
with a rule of conduct for which there is no disciplinary penalty. 297
IX. CONCLUSION

This Article surveys recent developments in legal ethics through May
31, 2016. For updates on developments after that date, you may visit the
website of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism. 298

297. Id. at 24. For example, there is no disciplinary penalty for not reporting a fellow
lawyer who has committed misconduct. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2016).
298. As a service to the Georgia bench and bar, the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism provides periodic updates and other resources on recent developments in
Georgia legal ethics. Visit http://law.mercer.edulacademics/centers/clep/updates-legalethics/.
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